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Abstract
We consider the Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel (GMAC-WT). In this scenario,
multiple users communicate with an intended receiver in the presence of an intelligent and informed
wire-tapper who receives a degraded version of the signal at the receiver. We define suitable security
measures for this multi-access environment. Using codebooks generated randomly according to a Gaus-
sian distribution, achievable secrecy rate regions are identified using superposition coding and TDMA
coding schemes. An upper bound for the secrecy sum-rate is derived, and our coding schemes are shown
to achieve the sum capacity. Numerical results showing the new rate region are presented and compared
with the capacity region of the Gaussian Multiple-Access Channel (GMAC) with no secrecy constraints,
quantifying the price paid for secrecy.
Index Terms
Secrecy Capacity, Gaussian Multiple Access Channel, Wire-Tap Channel
† This work has been supported by NSF grant CCF-0514813 “Multiuser Wireless Security”, and was presented in part in
Asilomar 2005 [1], and ISIT 2006 [2].
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon, in [3], analyzed secrecy systems in communications and showed that, to achieve
perfect secrecy of communications, the conditional probability of the cryptogram given a message
must be independent of the actual transmitted message. In [4], Wyner applied this concept to
the discrete memoryless channel, with a wire-tapper who has access to a degraded version
of the intended receiver’s signal. He measured the amount of “secrecy” using the conditional
entropy ∆, the conditional entropy of the transmitted message given the received signal at the
wire-tapper. The region of all possible rate/equivocation, (R,∆), pairs is determined, and the
existence of a positive secrecy capacity, Cs, for communication below which it is possible to
limit the rate of information leaked to the wire-tapper to arbitrarily small values, is shown [4].
Carleial and Hellman, in [5], showed that it is possible to send several low-rate messages, each
completely protected from the wire-tapper individually, and use the channel at close to capacity.
The drawback is, in this case, if any of the messages are revealed to the wire-tapper, the others
might also be compromised. In [6], the authors extended Wyner’s results to Gaussian channels
and also showed that Carleial and Hellman’s results in [5] also held for the Gaussian channel.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, in [7], showed that Wyner’s results can be extended to weaker, so called
“less noisy” and “more capable” channels. Furthermore, they analyzed the more general case of
sending common information to both the receiver and the wire-tapper, and private information
to the receiver only.
More recently, the closely related problem of common randomness and secret key generation
has gathered attention. Maurer, [8], and Bennett et. al., [9], have focused on the process of
“distilling” a secret key between two parties in the presence of a wire-tapper. In this scenario,
the wire-tapper has partial information about a common random variable shared by the two
parties, and the parties use their knowledge of the wire-tapper’s limitations to generate a secret
key. Reference [9] breaks this down into three main steps: (i) advantage distillation: where the
two parties have zero wiretap capacity and need to find some way of creating an advantage
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over the wire-tapper, (ii) information reconciliation: where the secret key decided by one of the
partners is communicated to the other partner and the wire-tapper is still left with only partial
information about it, (iii) privacy amplification: where a new secret key is generated from the
previous one about which the wire-tapper has negligible information. In [8], it was shown that for
the case when the wire-tap channel capacity is zero between two users, the existence of a “public”
feedback channel that the wire-tapper can also observe can nevertheless enable the two parties to
be able to generate a secret key with perfect secrecy. This discussion was then furthered by [10]
and [11] where the secrecy key capacities and common randomness capacities, the maximum
rates of common randomness that can be generated by two terminals, were developed for several
models. It was also argued in [12], that the secrecy constraint developed by Wyner and later
utilized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner was “weak” since it only constrained the rate of information
leaked to the wire-tapper, rather than the total information. It was shown that Wyner’s scenario
could be extended to “strong” secrecy for discrete channels with no loss in achievable rates,
where the secrecy constraint is placed on the total information obtained by the wire-tapper, as
the information of interest might be in the small amount leaked. This corresponds to making
the leaked information go to zero exponentially rather than just inversely with n. Maurer then
examined the case of active adversaries, where the wire-tapper has read/write access to the
channel in [13]– [15]. Venkatesan and Anantharam examined the cases where the two terminals
generating common randomness were connected by different DMC’s in [16] and later generalized
this to a network of DMC’s connecting any finite number of terminals in [17]. Csisza´r and
Narayan extended Ahslwede and Csisza´r’s previous work to multiple-terminals by looking at
what a helper terminal can contribute in [18], and the case of multiple terminals where an
arbitrary number of terminals are trying to distill a secret key and a subset of these terminals
can act as helper terminals to the rest in [19].
More recently, the notion of the wire-tap channel has been extended to parallel channels and
fading channels [20]–[25]. Broadcast and interference channels with confidential messages were
considered in [26]. References [27], [28] examined the so called multiple access channel with
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confidential messages, where two transmitters try to keep their messages secret from each other
while communicating with a common receiver, finding an achievable region, and the capacity
region for some special cases.
In this paper, we define the Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel (GMAC-WT) where
multiple users are transmitting to a base station in the presence of AWGN, and a wiretapper
receives a noisy version of the signal received at the base station. For this new multi-transmitter
secrecy paradigm, we first define two separate secrecy constraints, which we call the individual
and collective secrecy constraints. These are (i) the normalized entropy of any set of messages
conditioned on the transmitted codewords of the other users and the received signal at the wire-
tapper, and (ii) the normalized entropy of any set of messages conditioned on the wire-tapper’s
received signal. The first set of constraints is more conservative to ensure secrecy of any subset
of users even when the remaining users are compromised. The second set of constraints ensures
the collective secrecy of any set of users, utilizing the secrecy of the remaining users. In [1],
we concerned ourselves mainly with the perfect secrecy rate region for both sets of constraints.
In this paper, we consider the general case where a pre-determined level of secrecy is provided.
Using codebooks generated according to a Gaussian distribution and superposition coding, we
find the achievable secrecy rate regions for each constraint, where users can communicate with
arbitrarily small probability of error with the intended receiver, while the wire-tapper is kept
ignorant to a pre-determined level. This scheme achieves the secrecy sum capacity for collective
constraints. We also find a secrecy rate region using TDMA and the results of [6] for a single-user.
This scheme achieves secrecy sum capacity for both constraints, but is smaller than the region
for collective constraints. When individual constraints are considered, the achievable region is
the convex hull of the union of the superposition coding and TDMA regions.
Finally, a word on notation: Throughout the paper, we denote vectors with bold letters, as
well as letters with superscripts as the length of the vector whenever necessary. Sets are denoted
using a script font. Also, for random variables X, Y , we use H(X) to refer to the entropy of X
when it is discrete, h(X) to refer to the differential entropy when X is continuous, and I(X ; Y )
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY MAY 2006, REVISED MARCH 2008. 5
to refer to the mutual information of X, Y . All the logarithms are taken to base 2, such that the
resulting information theoretic quantities are in bits.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider K users communicating with a receiver in the presence of a wire-tapper in a
Gaussian channel. The model under consideration is presented in Figure 1. In general, transmitter
k ∈ K , {1, . . . , K} chooses a message Wk from a set of equally likely messages Wk =
{1, . . . ,Mk}. The messages are encoded using (2nRk , n) codes into {X˜nk (Wj)}, where Rk =
1
n
log2Mk. The encoded messages {X˜k} = {X˜nk } are then transmitted, and the intended receiver
and the wire-tapper get Y˜ = Y˜ n and Z˜ = Z˜n, respectively. The receiver decodes Y˜ to get an
estimate of the transmitted messages, Wˆ. We would like to communicate with the receiver with
arbitrarily low probability of error, while maintaining secrecy to a pre-determined level δ. The
signals at the intended receiver and the wiretapper are then given by
Y˜ =
∑K
k=1
√
hMkX˜k + N˜M (1a)
Z˜ =
∑K
k=1
√
hWk X˜k + N˜W (1b)
where N˜M, N˜W are the AWGN at the intended receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. Each
component of N˜M ∼ N (0, σ2M) and N˜W ∼ N (0, σ2W). The transmit power constraints are given
by 1
n
∑n
i=1 X˜
2
ki ≤ ˜¯Pk, k = 1, . . . , K. Faithful to Wyner’s terminology, we shall call this channel
model, The Gaussian Multiple-Access Wire-Tap Channel (GMAC-WT).
Similar to the scaling transformation to put an interference channel in standard form, [29],
we can represent any GMAC-WT by an equivalent standard form, [2]:
Y =
∑K
k=1Xk +NM (2a)
Z =
∑K
k=1
√
hkXk +NW (2b)
where
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• the codewords {X˜} are scaled to get Xk =
√
hM
k
σ2M
X˜k;
• the new power constraints are P¯k =
hM
k
σ2M
˜¯Pk;
• the new wiretapper channel gains are hk =
hW
k
σ2M
hM
k
σ2W
;
• the AWGN are normalized by NM = 1σ2M N˜M and NW =
1
σ2W
N˜W.
In this paper, we shall examine the case where the wire-tapper receives a stochastically
degraded version of the signal received at the legitimate receiver, i.e., there exists a distribution
p˜(z|y) such that we can write p(z|x1, . . . , xK) = ∫∞−∞ p(y|x1, . . . , xK)p˜(z|y)dy. Similar to the
broadcast channel, since the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper do not cooperate, noise
correlations do not play a role, and as a result, the capacity of the stochastically degraded
wire-tap channel is the same as that of the physically degraded wire-tap channel, which means
p(y, z|x1, . . . , xK) = p(y|x1, . . . , xK)p(z|y). It can easily be shown that the wire-tapper gets a
stochastically degraded version of the receiver’s signal if h1 = . . . = hK ≡ h < 1. Equivalently,
we consider the physically degraded case, where the wire-tapper’s received signal is a noisier
version of the legitimate receiver’s scaled received signal, Z =
√
hY + NMW, where NMW has
each component ∼ N (0, 1− h) and is independent of Y. This model is illustrated in Figure
1. In practical situations, we can think of this as the wire-tapper being outside of a controlled
indoor environment, such as in [30] or just being able to wire-tap the receiver rather than receive
the signals itself.
A. The Secrecy Measures
Letting ∆S be our secrecy constraint for any subset S of users, we require that ∆S ≥ δ for
all sets S ⊆ K, with δ ∈ [0, 1] as the required level of secrecy. δ = 1 corresponds to perfect
secrecy, where the wire-tapper is not allowed to get any information; and δ = 0 corresponds to
no secrecy constraint. To that end, we define two sets of secrecy constraints using the normalized
equivocations for sets of users. These are:
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1) Individual Secrecy: We define the individual secrecy measure for a subset of users, S ⊆ K,
as
∆IS ,
H(WS |XSc,Z)
H(WS)
∀S ⊆ K = {1, . . . , K} (3)
where WS = {Wk}k∈S . ∆IS denotes the normalized entropy of the transmitted messages of
a set S of users, given the received signal at the wire-tapper as well as the remaining users’
transmitted symbols. As our secrecy criterion, this guarantees that the rate of information leaked
to the wire-tapper from a group of users is limited even if all the other users’ transmitted
codewords are compromised. Note that this is a stronger constraint than H(WS |WSc,Z), as
H(WS |WSc,Z) ≥ H(WS |WSc,XSc,Z) = H(WS |XSc,Z). In addition, from a practical point
of view, if the transmitted messages are compromised either due to byzantine users or some
other side information allowing the eavesdropper to decode the transmitted messages of a group
of users, there is no reason to expect that the transmitted codewords are not known to the
eavesdropper. Thus, this represents a scenario where users do not have to trust each other.
We note that if the individual secrecy constraints for all users in the set S are satisfied, i.e.,
∆k ≥ δ, ∀k ∈ S, then the constraint for set S is also satisfied. To see this, without loss of
generality, let S = 1, . . . , S where S ≤ K and assume H(Wk|Xkc ,Z)
H(Wk)
≥ δ. We can write
H(WS |XSc,Z) =
S∑
k=1
H(Wk|W k−1,XSc,Z) (4)
≥
S∑
k=1
H(Wk|W k−1,Xkc,Z) (5)
=
S∑
k=1
H(Wk|Xkc,Z) (6)
≥
S∑
k=1
δH(Wk) (7)
= δH(WS) (8)
where (5) follows using conditioning, (6) is due to the fact that Wj is conditionally independent
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of all Wk given Xk,Z. (7) comes from our assumption that for all k ∈ S, ∆Ik ≥ δ. Thus, for any
subset of users the individual secrecy constraints for all users also guarantee the joint secrecy
of the same level for the entire set.
2) Collective Secrecy: Clearly (3) is a conservative measure where users do not place any trust
on each other. We now define a revised secrecy measure to take into account the multi-access
nature of the channel where users rely on others to achieve secrecy for the whole group.
∆CS ,
H(WS |Z)
H(WS)
∀S ⊆ K (9)
Using this constraint guarantees that each subset of users maintains a level of secrecy greater
than δ. Since this must be true for all sets of users, collectively the system has at least the same
level of secrecy. However, if a group of users are somehow compromised, the remaining users
may also be vulnerable. We require the secrecy constraint to be satisfied separately for each
S ⊆ K, since otherwise it is possible to have ∆CS ≥ δ, but ∆CJ < δ for some J ⊂ S. However,
if δ = 1, i.e. when we require perfect secrecy, we can show that ∆CK ≥ 1− ǫ⇒ ∆CS ≥ 1− ǫ′ for
all S ⊆ K, where ǫ′ → 0 as ǫ→ 0. To see this, write
H(WS |Z) +H(WSc) ≥ H(WS|Z) +H(WSc|WS ,Z) (10)
= H(WK|Z) (11)
≥ (1− ǫ)H(WK) (12)
= (1− ǫ)H(WS) + (1− ǫ)H(WSc) (13)
where (11) follows from the chain rule of entropy and (12) from the requirement for perfect
secrecy. Comparing the left hand side of (10) and (13), since conditioning cannot increase
entropy, we see that we have to have
H(WS |Z)
H(WS)
≥ 1− ǫ′ (14)
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where ǫ′ ,
(
1 + H(WSc)
H(WS)
)
ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. Thus, perfect secrecy for the ensemble of users
guarantees perfect secrecy for all subsets of users.
B. The δ-secret Achievable Rate Region
Definition 1 (Achievable Rates with δ-secrecy): Let ξ = I if using individual constraints, and
ξ = C if using collective constraints. The rate K-tuple R = (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be achievable
with δ-secrecy under constraint ξ, if for any given ǫ > 0 there exists a code of sufficient length
n such that
1
n
log2Mk ≥ Rk − ǫ, k = 1, . . . , K (15)
Pe ≤ ǫ (16)
∆ξS ≥ δ, ∀S ⊆ K (17)
where user k chooses one of Mk symbols to transmit according to the uniform distribution, ∆ξS
denotes the secrecy constraint, and is given by (3) if ξ = I , and by (9) if ξ = C. We will call
the set of all achievable rates with δ-secrecy, the δ-secret achievable rate region, and denote it
Cξ(δ).
C. Some Preliminary Definitions
Before we state our results, we also define the following quantities for any S ⊆ K.
PS ,
∑
k∈SPk (18)
RS ,
∑
k∈SRk (19)
CMS ,
1
2
log (1 + PS) (20)
CWS ,
1
2
log (1 + hPS) (21)
C˜WS ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
hPS
1 + hPSc
)
(22)
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Alternately, we also use the subscript sum when S = K.
III. ACHIEVABLE δ-SECRECY RATE REGIONS
In this section, we find a set of achievable rates using Gaussian codebooks, which we denote
by G(δ). We first give the achievable regions satisfying the individual and collective secrecy
constraints, denoted by G I(δ) and GC(δ) respectively, using superposition coding. We then give
the region when TDMA is used, denoted GT(δ), and satisfies both secrecy constraints. For the
collective secrecy constraints, the TDMA region is seen to be smaller than the superposition
coding region. For the individual constraints, the achievable region is the convex hull of the
union of the superposition and TDMA regions, denoted G I∪(δ).
A. Individual Secrecy
In [6], it has been shown that Gaussian codebooks can be used to maintain secrecy for the
single user Gaussian wire-tap channel. Using a similar approach, we present an achievable region
for δ-secrecy using individual secrecy constraints in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The following region is achievable with δ-secrecy for the GMAC-WT using
Gaussian codebooks.
G I(δ) =

R : RS ≤ min

CMS , 1δ

CMS −∑
k∈S
CWk



 ∀S ⊆ K

 (23)
Proof: Coding Scheme: Let R = (R1, . . . , RK) satisfy (23). For each user k ∈ K, consider
the scheme:
1) Let Mk = 2n(Rk−ǫ′) where 0 ≤ ǫ′ < ǫ. Let Mk = MksMk0 where, for some 1 ≥ µk ≥ δ to
be chosen later, Mks = Mµkk , Mk0 = M
1−µk
k . We then have Rk = Rks + Rk0 + ǫ′, where
Rks =
1
n
logMks and Rk0 = 1n logMk0. We can choose ǫ
′ and n to ensure that Mks,Mk0
are integers.
2) Generate 3 codebooks Xks,Xk0 and Xkx. Xks consists of Mks codewords, each compo-
nent of which is drawn from N (0, λksPk − ε). Codebook Xk0 has Mk0 codewords with
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each component drawn from N (0, λk0Pk − ε) and Xkx has Mkx codewords with each
component drawn from N (0, λkxPk − ε). Here, ε is an arbitrarily small number to ensure
that the power constraints are satisfied with high probability, and λks+λk0+λkx=1. Define
Rkx =
1
n
logMkx and Mkt = MkMkx.
3) Each message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk} is mapped into a message vector Wk = (Wks,Wk0)
where Wks ∈ {1, . . . ,Mks} and Wk0 ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk0}. Since Wk is uniformly chosen,
Wks,Wk0 are also uniformly distributed.
4) To transmit message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk}, user k finds the 2 codewords corresponding to
components of Wk from Xks and Xk0, and also uniformly chooses a codeword from Xkx.
He then adds all these codewords and transmits the resulting codeword, Xk, so that we are
actually transmitting one of Mkt codewords. Let Rkt = 1n logMkt+ǫ
′ = Rks+Rk0+Rkx+ǫ′.
Specifically, the rates are chosen to satisfy ∀S ⊆ K:
∑
k∈SRks =
∑
k∈SµkRk ≤ CMS −
∑
k∈S
CWk (24)
Rk0 +Rkx = (1− µk)Rk +Rkx = CWk , ∀k ∈ S (25)
∑
k∈SRkt =
∑
k∈S [Rk +Rkx] ≤ CMS (26)
Consider the sub-code {Xks}Kk=1. From this point of view, the coding scheme described is
equivalent to each user k ∈ K selecting one of Mks messages, and sending a uniformly chosen
codeword from among Mk0Mkx codewords for each. Let ∆˜ik =
H(Wks|Xkc ,Z)
H(Wks)
and write:
H(Wks|Xkc,Z) = H(Wks|Xkc)− I(Wks;Z|Xkc) (27)
= H(Wks)− I(Wks;Z|Xkc) (28)
= H(Wks)− I(Wks;Z|Xkc) + I(Wks;Z|XK) (29)
= H(Wks)− h(Z|Xkc)+h(Z|Wks,Xkc)+h(Z|XK)−h(Z|XK,Wks) (30)
= H(Wks)− I(Xk;Z|Xkc) + I(Xk;Z|Wks,Xkc) (31)
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where (28) follows from the fact that the secret message of user k is independent of the
codewords of the remaining users, and (29) follows since the received signal at the eavesdropper
is independent of the transmitted secret messages given the actual transmitted codewords. Thus,
we have:
∆˜ik =
H(Wks|Xkc,Z)
H(Wks)
= 1− I(Xk;Z|Xkc)− I(Xk;Z|Wks,Xkc)
H(Wks)
(32)
By the converse to the coding theorem for the Gaussian Multiple Access Channel, we have
I(Xk;Z|Xkc) ≤ nCWk . We can also write
I(Xk;Z|Wks,Xkc) = H(Xk|Wks,Xkc)−H(Xk|Wks,Xkc,Z) (33)
For each secret message of user k, our coding scheme implies that it sends one of Mk0Mkx
possible codewords. By choosing Rk0, Rkx to satisfy (25), we guarantee that
H(Xk|Wks,Xkc) = H(Xk|Wks) = nCWk (34)
Also,
H(Xk|Wks,Xkc,Z) ≤ nδn (35)
where δn → 0 due to Fano’s Inequality. This stems from the fact that given Wks, the sub-code
for user k is, with high probability, a “good” code for the wiretapper. Combining these in (32),
we can write
∆˜ik ≥ 1−
nCWk − nCWk + nδn
H(Wks)
= 1− ǫ (36)
where ǫ = δn
Rks
→ 0 as n→∞.
Then, we can write
∆Ik =
H(Wk|Xkc,Z)
H(Wk)
≥ H(Wks|Xkc,Z)
H(Wk)
≥ (1− ǫ)H(Wks)
H(Wk)
≥ (1− ǫ)µkRk
Rk
≥ δ (37)
Since (37) holds for all k = 1, . . . , K, from (8) we have ∆IS ≥ δ, ∀S ⊆ K.
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Remark 1: In this case, the maximum δ-secrecy sum-rate achievable is given by
RIsum(δ) = min
{
CMK,
1
δ
[
CMK −
K∑
k=1
CWk
]}
(38)
Observe that there is a reduction of ∑Kk=1CWk ≥ CWK in the δ-secrecy sum-rate due to secrecy
constraints when the second term is the minimum. Also observe that the transmission of all the
users with their maximum power may not be optimal for this case.
B. Collective Secrecy
Theorem 2: We can transmit with δ-secrecy using Gaussian codebooks at rates in the region
GC(δ) defined as
GC(δ) ,
{
R : RS ≤ min
{
CMS ,
1
δ
[
CMS − C˜WS
]}
∀S ⊆ K
}
(39)
Proof: Let R = (R1, . . . , RK) satisfy (39) and assume the coding scheme is the same as
described in the individual constraints case, except that instead of (24)–(26), we will choose the
rates such that for all S ⊆ K,
∑
k∈SRks =
∑
k∈SµkRk ≤ CMS − C˜WS (40)
∑K
k=1[Rk0 +Rkx] =
∑K
k=1[(1− µk)Rk +Rkx] = CWK (41)
∑
k∈SRkt =
∑
k∈S [Rk +Rkx] ≤ CMS (42)
From (42) and the GMAC coding theorem, with high probability the receiver can decode the
codewords with low probability of error. To show ∆CS ≥ δ, ∀S ⊆ K, we concern ourselves
only with MAC sub-code {Xks}Kk=1. From this point of view, the coding scheme described is
equivalent to each user k ∈ K selecting one of Mks messages, and sending a uniformly chosen
codeword from among Mk0Mkx codewords for each. Let WsS = {Wks}k∈S and ∆˜cS = H(W
s
S
|Z)
H(Ws
S
)
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and define XΣ =
∑K
k=1Xk. For K write
H(WsK|Z) = H(WsK)− I(WsK;Z) (43)
= H(WsK)− I(WsK;Z) + I(WsK;Z|XΣ) (44)
= H(WsK)− h(Z) + h(Z|WsK) + h(Z|XΣ)− h(Z|WsK,XΣ) (45)
= H(WsK)− I(XΣ;Z) + I(XΣ;Z|WsK) (46)
where (44) follows from WsK → XΣ → Z. Therefore, we have:
∆˜cK =
H(WsK|Z)
H(WsK)
= 1− I(XΣ;Z)− I(XΣ;Z|W
s
K)
H(WsK)
(47)
Consider the two terms individually. First, we have the sum-rate bound of the multiple access
channel to the eavesdropper:
I(XΣ;Z) ≤ nCWK (48)
I(XΣ;Z|WsK) = H(XΣ|WsK)−H(XΣ|WsK,Z). Since user k sends one of Mk0Mkx codewords
for each message, from (41) we have
H(XΣ|WsK) = log
(∏K
k=1Mk0Mkx
)
(49)
= nCWK (50)
We can also write
H(XΣ|WsK,Z) ≤ nη′n (51)
where η′n → 0 as n → ∞ since, with high probability, the eavesdropper can decode XΣ given
W
s
K due to (41). Using (40), (41), (48), (50) and (51) in (47), we get
∆˜cK ≥ 1−
CWK − CWK + η′n
CMK − CWK
→ 1 as η′n → 0 (52)
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The proof is completed by noting that due to (14), ∆˜cK = 1 implies ∆˜cS = 1, ∀S ⊆ K, and
writing
∆S ≥ H(W
s
S |Z)
H(WS)
=
H(WsS)
H(WS)
=
∑
k∈SµkRk∑
k∈SRk
≥ δ (53)
We note that this way the achievable δ-secrecy sum-rate is
RCsum(δ) = min
{
CMK,
1
δ
[CMK − CWK]
}
(54)
C. Time-Division
We can also use TDMA to get an achievable region. Since, in such a scheme, only one user
is transmitting at a given time, both sets of constraints collapse down to a set of single-user
secrecy constraints, for which the results were given in [6]:
Theorem 3: Consider this scheme: Let αk ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, . . . , K and ∑Kk=1 αk = 1. User k
only transmits αk of the time with power P¯k/αk using the scheme described in [6]. Then, the
following set of rates is achievable:
⋃
0α1∑
K
k=1
αk=1
{
R : Rk ≤ min
{
αk
2δ
log
(
αk + P¯k
αk + hP¯k
)
,
αk
2
log
(
1 +
P¯k
αk
)}
, k = 1, . . . , K
}
(55)
We will call the set of all R satisfying the above, GT(δ).
Proof: Follows directly from [6, Theorem 1].
Note that with this scheme, the achievable δ-secrecy sum-rate is given by
RTsum(δ,α) =
K∑
k=1
min
{
αk
2δ
log
(
αk + P¯k
αk + hP¯k
)
,
αk
2
log
(
1 +
P¯k
αk
)}
(56)
Theorem 4: The above described TDMA scheme achieves a maximum sum-rate of
RTsum(δ) = min
{
CMK,
1
δ
[CMK − CWK]
}
(57)
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using the optimum time-sharing parameters
α∗k =
P¯k∑K
j=1 P¯j
(58)
Proof: Maximizing each term in (56) over the time-sharing parameters {αk}, is a convex
optimization problem over αk. Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to αk and
equating it to zero gives (58), which simultaneously minimizes both terms in the minimum.
Using this in (56) yields (57).
Since in this scheme only one user is transmitting at any given time, both individual and
collective constraints are satisfied. We see that for collective secrecy constraints, this region
is a subset of GC(δ). For individual secrecy constraints, this does not hold. We can then, using
time-sharing arguments, find a new achievable region for individual constraints that is the convex-
closure of the union of the two regions.
Theorem 5: The following region is achievable for individual secrecy constraints:
G I∪(δ) = convex closure of (G I(δ) ∪ GT(δ)) (59)
IV. δ-SECRECY SUM CAPACITY
In this section, we present an upper bound on the δ-secrecy sum-rate, denoted Csum(δ), for
both individual and collective constraints, and show that this bound corresponds to the δ-secrecy
sum-rate achievable under both constraints, giving us the secrecy sum-capacity of GMAC-WT
for individual and collective constraints. We note that a sum-rate constraint on both individual
and collective constraints can be obtained using the constraints for the set K. In this case, both
sets of constraints collapse down to
∆K ,
H(WK|Z)
H(WK)
≥ δ (60)
Theorem 6: For the GMAC-WT, the δ-secrecy sum-capacity for both individual and collective
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secrecy constraints is given by
Csum(δ) = min
{
CMK,
1
δ
[CMK − CWK]
}
(61)
Proof: We first show that the right-hand side of (61) is an upper bound on the δ-secrecy
sum-rate for both constraints. Observe that (61) is equal to the secrecy sum-rate achievable in
(54) for collective constraints using superposition coding, and by TDMA in (57), which satisfies
both collective and individual constraints. Hence, we get the δ-secrecy sum-capacity of the
GMAC-WT for both individual and collective constraints.
The first term in the minimum of (61) is due to the converse for the GMAC, since the intended
receiver needs to be able to decode the transmitted messages. To see the second term, assume
δ > 0. This is without loss of generality, since if δ = 0, we have no secrecy constraint and only
the first term applies. We first note that from Fano’s inequality, we have
H(WK|Y,Z) ≤ H(WK|Y) ≤ nηn (62)
where ηn → 0 as n→∞. We then use the constraint in (60):
RK =
1
n
H(WK) (63)
≤ 1
nδ
H(WK|Z) (64)
≤ 1
nδ
[H(WK|Z) + nηn −H(WK|Y,Z)] (65)
=
1
nδ
I(WK;Y|Z) + η′n (66)
≤ 1
nδ
I(XK;Y|Z) + η′n (67)
where we used (62) in (65), and WK → XK → Y → Z in the last step. We now adopt Lemma
10 in [6] to upper bound the differences between the received signal entropies at the receiver
and wire-tapper:
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Lemma 7 (Lemma 10 in [6]): Let ξ = 1
n
h(Y) where Y,Z are as given in (2). Then,
h(Y)− h(Z) ≤ nξ − nφ(ξ) , n
2
log
[
2πe
(
1− h+ h2
2ξ
2πe
)]
(68)
Proof: The proof follows using the entropy power inequality [31]. Recall that we can write
h(Z) = h(
√
hY +NMW). Then, using the entropy power inequality, we have
2
2
n
h(Z) = 2
2
n
h(
√
hY+NMW) ≥ 2 2n [h(Y)+n log
√
h] + 2
2
n
h(NMW) (69)
Now h(Y) = nξ and h(NMW) = n2 log[2πe(1− h)]. Hence,
2
2
n
h(Z) ≥ h22ξ + 2πe(1− h) (70)
which, after taking the log, gives
h(Z) ≥ n
2
log
[
h22ξ + 2πe(1− h)
]
(71)
=
n
2
log
[
2πe
(
1− h + h2
2ξ
2πe
)]
(72)
subtracting from h(Y) = nξ completes the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 7.1:
h(Y)− h(Z) ≤ n[CMK − CWK] (73)
Proof: From the converse to the GMAC coding theorem, we can show that
h(Y) ≤ n
2
log (2πe(1 + PK)) (74)
Let h(Y) = nξ. Then, ξ ≤ 1
2
log (2πe(1 + PK)), and since φ(ξ) is a non-increasing function of
ξ, we get φ(ξ) ≥ φ
(
1
2
log (2πe(1 + PK))
)
. Thus,
h(Y)− h(Z) ≤ n
2
log (2πe(1 + PK))− n
2
log [2πe (1− h+ h(1 + PK))] (75)
= n[CMK − CWK] (76)
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Now, we can use (67) to write
I(XK;Y|Z) = I(XK;Y,Z)− I(XK;Z) (77)
= I(XK;Y) + I(XK;Z|Y)− I(XK;Z) (78)
= I(XK;Y)− I(XK;Z) (79)
= h(Y)− h(Y|XK)− h(Z) + h(Z|XK) (80)
=
n∑
i=1
[h(Zi|XK,i)− h(Yi|XK,i)] + [h(Y)− h(Z)] (81)
=
[
n
2
log (2πe)− n
2
log (2πe)
]
+ [h(Y)− h(Z)] (82)
= h(Y)− h(Z) (83)
≤ n[CMK − CWK] (84)
where we used XK → Y → Z to get (78), and applied Corollary 7.1 in the last step. Using (84)
in (67) completes the proof.
To see when we the secrecy constraint is more constraining on the sum-rate than the decod-
ability constraint, we can write (61) also as
Csum(δ) =


1
2
log (1 + PK) , if δ ≤ 1− log(1+hPK)log(1+PK)
1
2δ
log
(
1+PK
1+hPK
)
, if δ ≥ 1− log(1+hPK)
log(1+PK)
(85)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS
It can be seen that if the wire-tapper’s channel is much worse than that of the legitimate
receiver, i.e., h → 0, then Csum(δ) → C(PK), we incur no loss in δ-secrecy sum-capacity. On
the other hand, if the wire-tapper’s signal is not much degraded, i.e., h→ 1, then Csum(δ)→ 0,
and it is no longer possible to communicate with secrecy.
An interesting point to note is that the secrecy sum-capacity, Csum(δ), is upper bounded by
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1
2δ
log
(
1+PK
1+hPK
)
, which is an increasing function of PK for h < 1, but as PK → ∞, Csum(δ) is
upper bounded by − 1
2δ
log h. We see that regardless of how much power we have available, the
δ-secrecy sum-capacity with a non-zero level of secrecy is limited by the channel’s degradedness,
h, and the level of secrecy required, δ. Also, it is inversely proportional to the level of secrecy
desired, δ, but inversely proportional to the logarithm of h, the degradedness of the channel.
Since in the range [0, 1], log(x) goes to 0 faster than −x−1, an increase in h affects δ-secrecy
sum-capacity more than a similar increase in δ. This can be seen in Figures 2–4 which show
the region G for δ = 0.01, 0.5, 1 and h = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 for two users. When δ → 0, we are
not concerned with secrecy, and the resulting region corresponds to the standard GMAC region,
[31]. The region for δ = 1 corresponds to the perfect secrecy region, i.e., transmitting at rates
within this region, it is possible to limit the rate of information leakage to the wire-tapper to
arbitrarily small values. It is seen that relaxing the secrecy constraint may provide a larger
region, the limit of which is the GMAC region. Note that it is possible to send at capacity of
the GMAC and still provide a non-zero level of secrecy, the minimum value of which depends
on the level of degradedness, h. Especially when the degradedness is high, i.e., h → 0, then
we note that the achievable secrecy regions for δ = 0.01 and δ = 0.5 coincide with the GMAC
region without the secrecy constraint. Also shown in the figures are the regions achievable by
the TDMA scheme described in the previous section. Although TDMA achieves the secrecy
sum capacity with optimum time-sharing parameters, this region is in general contained within
GC(δ). Depending on h and δ, the TDMA region is sometimes a superset of G I(δ), as observed
in Figures 2, 3, sometimes a subset of G I(δ), as observed in Figure 4 when δ = 0.01 or δ = 0.5,
and sometimes the two regions can be used with time-sharing to enlarge the achievable region
with individual constraints, see Figure 4, δ = 1. Close examination of these figures show that
when the eavesdropper has a much worse channel, i.e., low h, and the secrecy constraint δ
is low, then G I(δ) gives a larger region. However, as we increase the secrecy constraint and
the eavesdropper has a less noisy version of the intended receiver’s signal, the TDMA region
becomes more dominant.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY MAY 2006, REVISED MARCH 2008. 21
Another interesting note is that even when a user does not have any information to send, it can
still generate and send random codewords to confuse the eavesdropper and help other users when
considering the collective secrecy constraints1. This can be seen in Figures 2–4 as the TDMA
region does not end at the “legs” of GC(δ) when GC(δ) is not equal to the GMAC capacity region.
In addition, as noted in [5], the intended receiver decodes the codeword transmitted completely,
and as such ⌊1
δ
⌋ low-rate messages can be transmitted each in perfect secrecy by the users.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined secure communications in a multiple access channel in the presence of a
wire-tapper. Defining the appropriate secrecy measures, we have found achievable secrecy rate
regions, and established the secrecy sum capacity of the GMAC-WT.
A main contribution of this paper is that, we show that the multiple-access nature of the channel
can be utilized to improve the secrecy of the system. Allowing confidence in the secrecy of all
users, the secrecy rate of a user is improved since the undecoded messages of any set of users
acts as additional noise at the wire-tapper and precludes it from decoding the remaining set of
users.
The results in this paper are based on the wire-tapper having access to a degraded version of the
intended receiver’s signal. The case where the eavesdropper’s received signal is not necessarily
degraded, termed the General Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel, where some users may
help improve the secrecy rates for other users by jamming the eavesdropper is explored in a
follow-up work, [33]. The secrecy constraints in this paper are assumed to be identical across
the users. It might be interesting to explore heterogeneous scenarios where users might have
different secrecy requirements. We assume in this paper that the eavesdropper’s channel gains
are known to the legitimate parties. These channel gains may not be easy to obtain in practice.
If the eavesdropper is known to be outside a certain area, we might opt to have a worst case
system design, considering the boundary of the “secure” area.
1This general idea is explored in detail in our follow-up work [32], [33].
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Finally, we remark that information theoretic secrecy has attracted a lot of attention in the
research community including various multiterminal formulations since the submission of this
work, for which we refer the reader to [33] and the references therein.
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Fig. 1. Equivalent GMAC-WT System Model.
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Fig. 2. Regions for P1 = 10, P2 = 5, δ = {0.01, 0.5, 1} and h = 0.1
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Fig. 4. Regions for P1 = 10, P2 = 5, δ = {0.01, 0.5, 1} and h = 0.9
